Human rights discourse in the West has a deep connection to Christian theology and what might be called 'theocentrism.' Th is view locates human rights in the God-created order of the world-and not in the capacities of sentient beings. Th is article examines and criticizes some recent theocentric arguments. It focuses in particular on the claim made by some theocentric human rights defenders that secular individualism and democracy are wrong-headed and runs counter to Christian theology. Th is article provides a critique of recent theocentric arguments about human rights and briefl y discusses an alternative that locates rights in the capacities of sentient beings.
I. Introduction
Human rights discourse in the West has a deep connection to Christian theology. Locke, for example, thought that human rights were objective moral entitlements that were found in the structure of God-created natural law.
1 But some scholars and religious leaders worry that the extension of Christian ideas toward individualism and democracy is wrong-headed. Despite several centuries of secularization, some argue that the idea of individual rights is a bad idea that runs counter to Christian theology. Robert Kraynak 2 has argued that Christian faith is only compatible with a hierarchically ordered view of the universe and some form of central monarchic power; and Joan and Oliver O'Donovan 3 have argued against liberal human rights and democracy (and against the liberal sympathies of Christians such as Maritain 4 and even Pope John Paul II). Humanists may think that this is simply a reductio ad absurdum of Christianity: if Christianity is opposed to liberaldemocracy, then so much the worse for Christianity. Although I am sympathetic to this humanist critique, I believe that one must take seriously the theocentric criticism of human rights discourse since it challenges us to fi nd some ground for human rights ideas other than in the creative power of God. Th e most plausible alternative is to locate human rights in the capacities of sentient beings.
Th e purpose of the present article is to provide a critique of recent theocentric arguments about human rights. I won't attack theocentrism directly here with an argument against the existence of God. Rather, I will argue that rights discourse should avoid the 'speciesist' assumptions of the theocentrists who argue that rights are grounded in the God-given endowment of members of the human species. Th eocentrism is closely linked to what Peter Singer called "speciesism"
5 insofar as the natural order is supposed to be Created by God, with humans uniquely at the top. Th e alternative is to move beyond both speciesism and theocentrism and to locate rights in the capacities of sentient beings.
II. Contemporary Th eocentrism
I use the term 'theocentrism' here in an eff ort to echo discussions by Singer, Tom Regan, 6 and others who critique speciesism and anthropocentrism. Moreover, the term theocentrism is meant to be a reminder of the hierarchical view in which God is the center and His creatures are on the periphery. By the theocentric argument, I mean an argument that claims that human rights discourse only makes sense in a God-centered universe, where the Creator God establishes for us something like 'right order.' Th e theocentrism I have in mind here is Christian theocentrism (but we should note that other religious traditions, such as Islam, make similar sorts of arguments). 7 recent proponents of this idea, along with Michael J. Perry, 9 the O'Donovans, and others. Th e theocentric argument holds that the idea of a God-given right order provides a better foundation for the idea of rights than the idea of individual creatures with inherent rights, such as was developed by Locke and others in the Enlightenment. It is true that Locke and Enlightenment thinkers such as Jefferson remain theocentric insofar as they base rights in our God-given endowment. But the Lockean tradition is too individualistic and Jeff ersonian institutions are too secular, when viewed from the point of view of the contemporary theocentrists. Th e Lockean view separates individuals and claims that the state is the result of a social contract. Th e contemporary theocentrists worry about the pernicious result of some of the interrelated ideas of contemporary secular rights discourse: subjectivism and voluntarism, possessive individualism, and the very idea of the state as a social contract. O'Donovan puts it this way:
In a wholly secularized liberal democratic polity, where the only coherent public moral language is that of subjective rights, the only universally respected right will be that of freedom, understood as the sovereignty of the subject over his/her physical and moral world, that is, the subject's emancipation from all externally imposed material and spiritual constraints on his/her freedom of choice. In such a polity, rights claims are only limited by two horizons: the expanding horizon of technological ingenuity and the shrinking horizon of the public purse. Both have already become causes of popular unease, as the gathering clouds of ecological disaster reveal the Faustian character of technological hubris to ever-more people; and ever-more taxpayers are coming to realize that their political investment is subject to the law of diminishing returns, given the infl ationary logic of rights.
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It is fairly easy to see that this critique is closely connected to a broad political and ethical critique of secular society. A further worry, as articulated by the late Pope, John Paul II, is that secular human rights language can be used to support claims about the right to privacy and the right to satisfaction that are then used to support perverse sexual practices, the right to abortion, the right to assisted suicide, and other ideas that appear to violate the God-created order.
While the worry about sexual immorality is a minor point, an important point made by defenders of the theocentric argument is that recourse to some idea about the right order of the universe and the endowment of the human species provides the only way to include disabled human beings, fetuses, or even human embryonic stem cells within the class of beings who have rights. I think that it is true that those who reject theocentrism in thinking about rights have to fi nd a way to ground rights in basic capacities without thereby leaving out disabled members of our own species. To do so, we may have to admit that some nonhuman beings have rights as well. Th is extension of rights to non-humans simply does not fi t well within the theocentric framework in which God creates species distinctions and establishes natural order based on those distinctions.
I will briefl y sketch a more positive view of rights as grounded in the capacities of sentient beings toward the end of this paper. Such an approach does not rely upon species diff erences as given by God. Rather, it refl ects a more naturalistic approach to the idea of rights. If the problem is that by grounding rights in capacities, we exclude some humans with diminished capacities, then the solution is to be more inclusive about the sorts of capacities that matter. Th us I will suggest that once we eliminate God-created species diff erences from moral consideration, we may have to expand our thinking about the range of beings who can be said to have rights. Th is idea has been discussed by a variety of authors (e.g. R.M. Frey, 11 Tom Regan, 12 David DeGrazia, 13 and Peter Singer). 14 My aim here is to contribute to this conversation by arguing against the theocentric approach to rights.
One of the most important problems with the religious argument is its reliance on God as the mediator for rights claims. Th is approach does not look directly at the suff ering of others as a basis for rights claims. Rather, it maintains that rights are found either in the image of God that we see in man or in God's rights over us as Creator. Th is is the sense for describing this approach as theocentric: it puts God in the middle, with rights emanating from God through His creative activity. I will argue here that we should move beyond this theistic idea.
III. Historical and Contemporary Background
Th e history of human rights in the modern era begins with the idea that men are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights. Th us the idea of rights has long been explicitly linked to Christian theology. Locke put it this way: Th e state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infi nitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Locke's idea of rights locates our rights in the fact that human beings are the property of the Creator, who is the central organizing power and sovereign master. No one may violate our life, liberty, or possessions-not even the statebecause these blessings are bestowed upon us by God. Moreover, the Creator gave us each the same faculties and a common nature. Th is is an important argument against inequality: we are all the same before God. Th e theological source of this idea is not a minor point for Locke. Indeed Locke was committed to the idea that Christianity was a reasonable doctrine and to the defense of scripture, publishing Th e Reasonableness of Christianity in 1695, fi ve years after publication of the Two Treatises of Civil Government. 16 And Locke is infamous for stating that toleration should extend across Christian sects but that atheists cannot be tolerated because atheism 'dissolves all' and leaves the atheist without morality or a moral ground upon which to challenge intolerance.
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Sources for the idea of rights may be found in other religious traditions. But Christianity provided fertile ground for this idea. Christianity emphasizes the personal relationship between God and man and the idea that man is created in God's image. Martin Luther's idea that human beings are both priests and kings takes this idea further. By the 17th and 18th Centuries, Western Christians had discovered the idea of natural rights and they articulated this idea in religious language.
More contemporary philosophical accounts of rights have generally attempted to avoid such a theological grounding. Or at least they have attempted to connect the theological idea to a more secular approach. Dworkin notes, for example, that the idea that human beings are 'sacred' can be interpreted in a 'secular' as well as a 'religious' way.
18 Th e point here is that the use of language such as 'sacred' is meant to show that rights are inviolable or absolute. Th e dispute is, of course, about whether a secular grounding is suffi cient to produce inviolable rights or whether some religious ground is needed. Most authors recognize that the theocentric approach to rights has a long and important history that includes Locke's own contributions to human rights discourse. On Rawls' interpretation of this history, however, the point of Locke's focus on God is to direct our attention toward the generality of principles of right. 19 what is right is that which accords with God's will. But in fact this doctrine is normally supported by an argument from general principles. For example, Locke held that the fundamental principle of morals is the following: if one person is created by another (in the theological sense), then that person has a duty to comply with the precepts set to him by his creator. Th is principles is perfectly general and given the nature of the world on Locke's view, it singles out God as the legitimate moral authority" [John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1971) necessary or even desirable to invoke theology to ground the idea of human rights and that a suitable level of generality is attainable by using the heuristic of his 'original position.' In the end, Rawls' account of rights bases them upon a person's status as a citizen within a well-ordered society and not upon the theological principles of some "comprehensive doctrine."
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Contemporary philosophical approaches to human rights are often either deliberately antagonistic to religion or seek to side-step religion in order to attain consensus that includes a variety of religious believers and non-believers. Th e fi rst option-the anti-religious or humanistic approach-is found, to cite one recent example, in Brian Orend's book, Human Rights. 21 Orend concludes that appeals to "metaphysical humanity" are not persuasive: "In the face of assertions about faith, souls and God, many reasonable people are left asking for more. In my judgment, appeals to metaphysical properties are neither necessary nor suffi cient to ground human rights-holding status."
22 More recently, Alan Dershowitz begins his book on human rights by bashing the religious idea of rights that he fi nds, among other places, in the thinking of George W. Bush. Dershowitz writes: "If only it were true that a God, in whom everyone believed, had come down from the heavens and given the entire world an unambiguous list of the rights with which He endowed us. How much easier it would be to defend these sacred rights from alienation by mere mortals. Alas, the claim that rights were written down by the hand of the divinity is one of those founding myths to which we so desperately cling."
23
Th e second option is articulated by Rawls in his attempt to avoid religion entirely. Th eological speculation runs counter to certain constraints about what sorts of reasons are to be accepted in public discourse. In Rawls' language, the original position requires that we conceal our commitment to 'comprehensive doctrines' behind the veil of ignorance such that representatives of a variety of religions can come together to achieve consensus about human rights. In other words, theological speculation has no legitimacy in the sphere of public reason in which we are trying to establish a political conception of justice. Th is is related to Rawls' conclusion regarding religious toleration: even if we believe in the truth of a religious idea, it would be unreasonable to use the state to enforce this idea.
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Now the Rawlsian approach has provoked a backlash. Some authors argue that a Rawlsian approach to human rights is not suffi ciently sensitive to the profun- 32 that the idea of human rights at least has a religious history-even if it has grown beyond its theocentric origin.
IV. Th e Christian Tradition
As mentioned, the discussion and defense of human rights has a Christian heritage that extends back through Locke at least to Martin Luther. But the Christian defense of rights is not merely historical. Contemporary Christians continue to use the language of rights; and some argue that rights language can only be understood from a theocentric perspective. Occasionally the Christian approach has been a bit self-serving, as human rights language is used to argue in favor of religious liberty and against those nations (from the former Soviet Union to China and Sudan today) that restrict the free movement of Christians. But the Christian defense of human rights can be traced back to commandment to love your neighbor as yourself. Th e Christian defense of human rights holds that Jesus' radical re-interpretation of this Hebraic ideal extends love in a universal and equal way to all. One source for this is the parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke. Here, Jesus responds to the question of "who is my neighbor?" by indicating that neighborly love should transcend sectarian and ethnic boundaries (the Samaritan was a stranger who did the right thing in stopping to help his wounded 'neighbor'). On Michael Perry's interpretation of this idea, the Christian idea of loving the neighbor is not merely a command that must be obeyed; rather it is the fruit of a religious worldview that includes the brotherhood and sisterhood of all human beings.
What makes the imperative a religious human response and not merely a secular one is that the response is the existential yield of a religious conviction about how the world (including we-in-theworld) hangs together: in particular the conviction that the Other is, fi nally, one's own sister/ brother-and should receive, therefore, the gift of one's loving concern.
33 Although Locke and others developed this idea in the context of Protestantism, this is not specifi cally a Protestant idea. Catholic thinkers also use the language of human rights. Th e Catholic Church has embraced the idea of human rights for several decades. In 1963, Pope John XXIII articulated a view of human rights in Pacem in Terris as follows:
Any well-regulated and productive association of men in society demands the acceptance of one fundamental principle: that each individual man is truly a person. His is a nature, that is, endowed with intelligence and free will. As such he has rights and duties, which together fl ow as a direct consequence from his nature. Th ese rights and duties are universal and inviolable, and therefore altogether inalienable.
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Th is idea was rearticulated in 1968, by Pope Paul VI in his fi rst Peace Day message, where he argued that respect for human rights was essential to peace. And the idea has been repeated by popes ever since. John Paul II used the idea to articulate his pro-life or consistent ethic of life view, concluding that the right to life meant that abortion, euthanasia, war, etc. were all immoral. Th e basic idea of Christian human rights is grounded in a theocentric conception of the dignity of the human person. And this idea is supposedly based in scripture. As mentioned above, key texts in the New Testament include ideas about love of the neighbor and Jesus' creative expansion of these ideas to include strangers. But ultimately, the idea is traced back to the Genesis account of creation: human beings are created in the image of God and thus they have absolute value. Pope John Paul II begins his refl ection on the 'Gospel of Life' with a claim with a direct reference to Genesis 2:7: "Th e Gospel of life, proclaimed in the beginning when man was created in the image of God for a destiny of full and perfect life. wrong to kill human beings, whether fetuses or the aged and infi rm. And the Pope argues that one of the main problems for the Gospel of Life is that modern secular democracies end up allowing killing in the name of liberty and human rights.
V. Challenging the Christian Basis
It is important that Christians embrace the idea of human rights. But there are problems with grounding human rights in Christian theology. Th ose who argue that the idea of human rights has its most adequate and essential grounding in the conceptual and textual depths of the Judeo-Christian tradition fi nd it hard to accept non-theological approaches to human rights. Moreover, the basic standpoint here is connected to defenses of divine command theories of ethics. And such ethical theories are susceptible to the humanistic critique of divine command ethics that extends from Paul Kurtz 36 back through Bertrand Russell, 37 all the way to Plato's Euthryphro. 38 We do not have space here to re-visit in detail the Divine Command theory and its critiques. But let us note that the divine command theory still has its defenders among philosophers, say for example in the work of Robert M. Adams 39 and Phillip L. Quinn. 40 Defenders of the Divine Command theory of ethics claim that God is both the source of ethics and the motive force for ethical behavior. Robert M. Adams explains the fi rst idea by claiming that God is the 'constitutive standard of excellence.' For Adams, this also means that "being excellent in the way that a fi nite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve as a reason for loving the thing."
41 Human rights would thus be grounded in the human resemblance to God. Moreover, divine command theorists will also argue that the theocentric account gives us a much stronger reason to respect human rights than any anthropological or social contract theory can give us.
Th e more specifi c claims about the theological source of human rights have been defended by a variety of philosophers including Tierney, 42 Th e general problem that provokes this sort of conclusion is the idea that secular or humanistic foundations of rights-talk are unstable, relativistic, and incapable of generating universal consensus. MacIntyre concluded quite some time ago now, that "natural or human rights are fi ctions" because the secular humanist tradition was unable to ground the idea in any adequate way. 45 More recently Perry has argued against secular approaches to human rights such as Dworkin's, Nussbaum's, 46 and Rorty's 47 by claiming that there is no consensus about human experience that allows the sort of universality that human rights claims are supposed to have. And Jeff rey Stout 48 and Stanley Hauerwas 49 have each also noted this problem. Th us the conclusion might appear to be that either rights are merely conventional (and so unstable and relativistic) or that they must be grounded, as Perry argues, in a religious idea about the sacredness of human beings. Nicholas Wolterstorff has recently taken this conclusion a step further and argued that rights can only be adequately grounded in a certain version of Christian theology. 50 It is this last view that I will critically examine in the rest of the paper, especially as presented recently by Nicholas Wolterstorff . 50 See Wolterstorff 's review of Perry: "Sacred and Inviolable" supra note 8. 51 Th is account follows a lecture that Wolterstorff gave as a Plenary Address at the meeting of the American Academy of Religion in November 2007. He received a standing ovation from nearly half of the large audience in attendance after telling the audience that the only legitimate grounding of human rights was found in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Perhaps this should be expected from a group of reli-
VI. Th e Argument Against Th eocentrism
Perry and Wolterstorff argue that human rights can have no adequate secular grounding because, as Perry puts it, the idea that human beings are sacred can only be explained in religious language. Th is could remain as a negative argument against secular and humanistic approaches to human rights. If so, then the conclusion would be a skeptical one: that we cannot attain the level of universality or objectivity that is necessary to ground absolute claims about human rights. But one need not view such a negative or skeptical argument as refuting a secular or humanistic approach to human rights. Pragmatists and humanists might agree with this fallibilist conclusion: there is no reason to presume that we must have an absolutely universal ideal of human rights. Moreover, we may want to reevaluate the claim that all human beings are sacred, especially when this is interpreted to mean that only human beings are sacred. While we should extend the idea of rights as far as we possible can to include as many human beings under its protective umbrella as possible, it may be that in order to extend it in this way, we may have to include some non-human beings under its protection. And we should admit that it is possible that some human beings do not have rights: those who are brain dead, in a vegetative state, or who have some other sort of severe incapacity.
Th e theocentric approach which locates rights in the endowment given to human beings by God relies upon the supposedly God-created distinction between human beings and nonhuman animals. Such a distinction really only makes sense within a theistic world-view that takes the Genesis story at least somewhat literally and that believes that species distinctions are God-created facts. But after Darwin, such a way of looking at the world is very diffi cult to support. It is more plausible to conclude that human beings are not by nature any more sacred than non-human beings. We have some more developed capacities than other species. But these diff erences in capacity do not create qualitatively diff erent sorts of beings.
A further problem is that the theocentric approach has no good reason to tolerate those who do not accept this religious idea. Without a certain kind of religious faith, according to this argument, rights talk is absurd. Since the absolute grounding of rights is supposed to be located in God's fi at, other traditions or ideas about rights are seen as false or inadequate. A non-absolute ground for human rights is rejected as insuffi cient; and any attempt to ground rights in an absolute other than God's fi at is also rejected as ultimately incoherent. Th is is problematic because it ends up in a kind of intolerance toward non-religious people, such as gion scholars but it should also be noted that the AAR is known for its recognition of religious diversity. What is troubling is that Wolterstorff 's argument does not acknowledge that rights claims can be grounded in diverse religious traditions (and even in non-religious traditions). Wolterstorff 's address was based upon his new book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
we saw in Locke's condemnation of atheism. Apparently, only Christians adequately comprehend the idea of rights; so non-Christians have a view that is either immoral (if they reject the idea of rights) or incoherent (if they accept the idea without its proper grounding). In our diverse world, such a view is not acceptable.
Th e theocentric argument for human rights is widely affi rmed by those who argue against secularization and who argue that non-theocentric arguments about human rights amount to a pernicious sort of relativism. One should note the important subtext to the theological argument as presented by Wolterstorff and others: if human rights can only be grounded in Christian theology, this means that the majority of human beings who do not accept this theology cannot have an adequate understanding of human rights. Indeed, defenders of this sort of account will fi nd it diffi cult to accept that non-Christians have any adequate conception or commitment to human rights. In other words, the fact of religious (and non-religious) diversity-and the vast consensus about human rights among those who come from a variety of traditions-gives us good reason to be suspicious of the attempt to locate human rights in Christian theology.
Th ere are two main moves in Wolterstorff 's argument. First, he claims that the idea of human rights is modeled on the idea of God's rights. Second, he claims that the modern attempt to ground rights in capacities, which he identifi es with the Kantian tradition, is inherently fl awed because it is unable to extend the idea of human rights to many beings who are human-the disabled and others who lack those capacities. Th is culminates in a slippery slope sort of argument that claims that without a theological grounding for human rights, we will end up killing Alzheimer's patients and others who lack the capacities that the modern tradition emphasizes.
Let's examine these two basic arguments in more detail.
A. Th e Th eological Argument
Th e theological argument claims that the idea of dignity and the idea of rights is derived from the idea of God himself as the being of dignity par excellence. Locke's argument held that we derived our rights from God as the creator and property holder. But Wolterstorff 's idea goes deeper into the analogy between God and man. According to Wolterstorff , the very idea of harm or wrong begins with the idea that God can be harmed or wronged. One might support this view by a close reading of the Old Testament. God is routinely wronged by the Hebrews. And indeed, the 10 Commandments begin with a list of ways in which God can be wronged. One must then give God what he deserves. As the Creator and Ruler of the universe-that is, as a being with infi nite dignity-he deserves devotion, love, and respect. Th us Wolterstorff argues that the idea of what it means to harm or wrong a human being is based upon an analogy with what it means to harm or wrong God. To make this analogy work, one must recall that human beings are supposed to be created in the image of God. Human dignity is derivative of the dignity of God. A similar sort of argument is made by Luther when he argues in Concerning Christian Liberty that the meaning of Christianity is that each human being is both a priest and king, sharing through Christ the dignity of king. I can't help but point out that Luther's argument about the dignity of man expresses intolerance toward nonbelievers: the kingship and priesthood and dignity of man is reserved for Christians only. Luther puts it this way:
Nor are we only kings and the freest of all men, but also priests for ever, a dignity far higher than kingship, because by that priesthood we are worthy to appear before God, to pray for others, and to teach one another mutually the things which are of God. For these are the duties of priests, and they cannot possibly be permitted to any unbeliever… But to an unbelieving person nothing renders service or work for good. He himself is in servitude to all things, and all things turn out for evil to him, because he uses all things in an impious way for his own advantage, and not for the glory of God.
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Setting the possibility of religious intolerance aside for the moment, let's note that this sort of argument is itself derivative of cosmological and theological speculation. If one accepts traditional Christian cosmology and the Divine Command theory of ethics, then this will make perfect sense. All value is derived from the Creator: and the value of the human is grounded in the value of the Maker. A less cosmological rendering of the argument might emphasize that is supposed to help us avoid relativism by turning respect for dignity into a moral absolute. When human dignity is grounded in the imago dei, then human rights become absolutes which can never be violated, for to violate human rights and insult the dignity of man would also be to insult God Himself.
Th is argument can be rejected for a number of reasons. First and most obviously, it hinges upon the acceptance of Christian theology. One needs further proof that there is a God, that He really created human beings in His image, and that He does demand the sort of dignity and respect described here. Th ere is much more to be said here than I can in this short article, including the problem noted above about global religious diversity. So I will focus on the very particular theological idea that is central to this argument: the very idea that God can be wronged or harmed.
If God is omnipotent, infi nite, and eternal, then it is not clear how He can be harmed. But this idea of wronging God is central to the idea that harm to humans is understood on analogy with harm to God. And indeed, it is needed to make sense of much of the Old Testament in which God's anger is motivated by the wrongs done to Him. One possibility is that when God is wronged, He is not harmed. Wrongs can be done without harming the person or the thing that is wronged (e.g., it might be wrong to lie to you, even though the lie does you no harm). But if God is not harmed, then his wrath and displeasure is not 'personal.' Rather, it is 'principle' in the sense that His anger is about the violation of ethical principles. When God's wrath erupts in response to a lack of piety, for example, the problem is not that God feels hurt or neglected-a perfect God cannot be hurt. Rather, the problem is that the principle of respect or piety has been violated. But if we follow the argument this far, we are left with a version of the Euthyphro argument against Divine Command theory. If God's wrath is principled in this way, then what matters is the principle and not the will of God.
At any rate, the theocentric approach seems to gets things backwards. God cannot really be harmed because He can lose nothing. But human beings can be harmed because of their fragility and fi nitude. Mortal human beings can be stripped of everything and reduced to nothing; God can never suff er this sort of loss. 53 To ground the idea of harm or the idea of rights upon analogy with harm to God is to ignore the actual concrete experience of human mortality, fragility, and susceptibility to harm.
Moreover, the theological approach off ers consolations that can minimize the harms that human beings suff er. It should be recalled that in the Beatitudes Jesus promises that all the harms of this life will be overcome in the Kingdom of God. Th is can serve as consolation for harm but when such harms are consoled in this way, then it appears that the moral signifi cance of the harm is minimized. Th us for some Christians, moral life is grounded in the Divine Command and not in the concrete face-to-face experience of the suff ering other. In other words, the need to respond to the demands of suff ering others can be minimized when human rights and human experience are mediated by God. 54 Th is is why a theist like Antonin Scalia can claim that for Christians-who believe in the afterlife and God's eternal reward-death is no big deal. But in order to take the claims of human rights seriously, it seems that we should think precisely that death is a big deal.
B. Th e Argument Against Capacity
Wolterstorff 's second argument is against the modern attempt to ground rights in human capacities. He locates this approach in Kant and his emphasis on rational 53 A Christian might object that the immortal soul of human beings cannot suff er absolute loss either. And a Christian might also object that the heart of Christian theology is the claim that God does undergo absolute loss in the death of the Christ. But the point is that this all requires extensive theological speculation that leads us away from the very real losses that are suff ered by those who enslaved, oppressed, and killed in the real word.
54 A Christian might respond that the parable of the Good Samaritan appears the demand this sort of face-to-face recognition of human suff ering and need. But we should note that the Wolterstorff argument does not itself begin from this sort of face-to-face encounter. I discuss Christian ethics and the parable of the Good Samaritan in Andrew Fiala, What Would Jesus Really Do? Th e Power and Limits of Jesus' Moral Teachings (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2007 autonomy. One of his basic arguments against this view is that it cannot extend the idea of human rights to many beings who are members of the human species but who lack human capacities, from fetuses to the disabled and the elderly. Wolterstorff then turns to a slippery slope sort of argument that is intended to be a coup de grace against the capacity approach. Th e slippery slope argument that claims that without a theocentric grounding for human rights, we may end up killing Alzheimer's patients and others who lack the capacity for rational autonomy. Or as John Paul II puts it, the secular grounding of rights allows for all sorts of pernicious uses of freedom: from abortion to euthanasia.
Th e fi rst part of this argument-the point about capacity-is important. It points to a fundamental principle about how we should understand the idea of rights. Th e second part-the slippery slope-is frankly something of a distraction. Th ere are good reasons not to kill Alzheimer's patients that have very little to do with theology; and there may be good arguments against euthanasia or abortion that do not rely upon God. Surely we can draw an inclusive line against killing that includes humans with diminished capacities without appeal to theology; and this line may include fetuses, depending upon how we fl esh out the question of potentiality. But one risk is that in drawing such an inclusive line, we may have to include some animals-since some of them have capacities that are greater than some diminished humans and the actual capacities of fetuses.
Th e problem here is that if we claim that animals possess rights of some sort, then the imago dei argument is reduced to absurdity. Recall that the basic idea is that human beings are created in the image of God. If we were to include animals among the beings that have rights, then they too would have to be created in the image of God. But this runs counter to the Genesis account and to most of the Christian way of understanding the dignity of man. A cynical atheist might further wonder whether it is true that an anencephalic baby is also created in the image of God. But the theist can respond by a claim about the capacities of the species homo sapiens: the species is created in the image of God; and this is true even if some specimens are abnormal or defi cient.
While Wolterstorff traces the capacity argument back to Kant, this argument is really more properly focused on those who understand rights in terms of cognitive capacity more broadly construed than Kant would allow. Animal rights activists and pro-abortion writers such as Tom Regan, Peter Singer, Mary Anne Warren, 55 and Michael Tooley 56 have sought to establish that cognitive capacity is essential for us to speak of anything like rights or a claim to moral consideration. One typical example of this way of arguing can be found in the work of 55 57 Frey argues that speciesist arguments are wrong because they are merely unfounded declarations of faith in the idea that God created the diff erence between humans and animals. Moreover, any morally relevant diff erence must be based upon diff erentiated experiential capacities because it is these capacitiesespecially the capacity to experience harm and to suff er-that are the focus of moral claims against us. Frey admits that some humans have experiential capacities that are below those of some animals. So we are faced with a choice: either we exclude some humans (the cognitively defi cient, the senile, the disabled, and perhaps fetuses) from moral concern or we include some nonhuman animals. But assuming that we do not want to exclude such members of our own species, we should include some animals in the sphere of moral concern. Now Wolterstorff 's argument gets things the other way round. He assumes that since we would not want to exclude cognitively defi cient humans, we must retreat to a speciesist argument about human rights. But the only way to defend this idea is to retreat still further to theology-since the capacity argument considers species boundaries to be somewhat unreliable as a guide to rights.
VII. Conclusion: Th e Argument in Favor of a Capacity Approach
We should look to harms in order to understand the idea of rights. And these harms should not be understood in reference to the Creator (as Locke and Wolterstorff each in their own way argue). Rather these harms are experience directly by those who are harmed. Th us the primary source for rights is the capacity to experience harm. Rights are not merely formal principles that are abstractly related to an account of a duty to God. Rather, they are claims that those who suff er make upon us; and such claims make sense to us because of empathy and our ability to see the suff ering of others. Wolterstorff admits this-as do others in the theological discussion such as Perry and even John Paul II. But this approach goes wrong when it moves beyond empathy to the theocentric argument. Instead of making this move, we should remain focused on empathy and the claims of those fi nite beings who suff er.
Th ose who have been harmed tell us so with their faces and their voices. Th ey scream out in pain and they complain of oppression and wrong (this may not include fetuses-but that's a point for a diff erent paper). Empathy and the ability to see the suff ering of others is part of the Christian tradition. Indeed, the parable of the Good Samaritan, which we referred to above, reminds us the importance of being able to see the suff ering of others. But to see the suff ering of others, we do not need Christian theology. Rather, compassion and empathy are important values in multiple faith traditions. And empathy is most likely located in a basic cognitive capacity shared by human beings (and perhaps by some non-human beings as well).
Th e idea of rights must be grounded in the experience of those who suff er. But suff ering is not a complex cognitive event. Rather, it only requires minimal consciousness or sentience. Th us Alzheimer's patients can be said to suff er and also those with a variety of disabilities and children and perhaps even fetuses. But so too can animals suff er. A non-theocentric account of rights must ground rights in the claims of those who suff er and are harmed. Unjustifi ed suff ering is wrong because the suff ering being does not like it; not because of some harm to God or some aff ront to His rule as Creator of these beings (as Locke put it).
Th is approach has much in common with Nussbaum's "human capabilities" approach. Nussbaum bases her idea of rights and entitlements upon essential claims about the basic capabilities of the human species. Her claims about these capabilities are supposed to be grounded empirically. And if there are exceptions such that some individual humans lack some of these basic capacities-say through disability or disadvantage-Nussbaum argues that the claims about the capacities of the species show us that we should take care to provide such disabled individuals with adequate extra support. For Nussbaum, entitlements "are not based solely upon the actual 'basic capabilities'" a person has; but "on the basic capacities characteristic of the human species…. Such entitlements would not exist were capabilities based only on individual endowment, rather than on the species norm." 58 I agree with this for the most part. But it is important to note that the second of Wolterstorff 's objection still holds contra Nussbaum. Although she stipulates that individual capacity is not the relevant place to look for rights, one could still object that only beings with the actual capacities are entitled to make rights claims. Th e diffi culty is that empirical generalizations about what Nussbaum calls "the species norm" can be articulated in a way that ignores the disabled and the disadvantaged, despite what Nussbaum claims to the contrary. Th eists want to argue that the solution to this problem is to refer back to God and the fact that the species is created in the image of God.
But a more obvious and direct solution to this problem is simply to lower the bar in terms of which capacities must be respected so that it is easier to include the disabled. Nussbaum does just this in arguing that bodily need is the place to begin in thinking about dignity and rights. And Nussbaum does want to extend the capabilities approach to include the disabled and even the non-human. So it is surprising that Nussbaum focuses on the capabilities of the 'human species' as she does in the above quotation. Rather, the better place to start would be to focus on the capabilities of sentient animals. I maintain that it is only by 'expanding the circle' in this way (to borrow a metaphor from Peter Singer) that we can 58 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice supra note 47, 285. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  401 fi nd a non-theocentric way to ground rights in the capacities of sentient beings. Th e theological tradition has been an important historical source for the idea of rights. But the time has come for us to move beyond the theocentric grounding of rights and fi nd a way to ground rights directly in the suff ering of sentient beings. 
